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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAY McCONNELL, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. 
THE COMMISSION OF 
FINANCE OF UTA'H, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
Case No. 96'3'5 
RESPONDEN'T'S PE'TI'TION FOR REHEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Ray M·cConnell, the plaintiff and respondent 
in the above-entitled m1atter, by and through his 
attorneys of record herein, pursuant to Rule 76 (e), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully peti-
tions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the 
above-entitled action upon the following grounds: 
1. The decision is erroneous because in effect 
it holds that the provisions of Section 3·5-1-62, 
U.C.A., 19;53, apply only when a recovery is effect-
ed through the filing of a lavvsuit, and then only 
between parties named in the lawsuit, which is 
contrary to the wording of the seetion itself which 
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states that it shall apply to any recovery obtained 
against the third party tort feasor. 
2. 'The construction placed upon subsection 
('2) nullifies the requirements of subsection ( 1 ) 
since it would require the injured employee to pay 
the total 1amount of attorney's fees involved regard-
less of the amount of the recovery or who were 
parties to the action, if one is filed. 
3. The decision completely ignores and is con-
trary to the doctrine of equitable subrogation which 
Section 35-1-62 incorporates and which has long 
been recognized at common law. 
WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully re-
quests that a rehearing be granted, that the court 
re-examine the law applicable to this case, and that 
an order be entered affirming the judgment of the 
trial court, or in the alternative, that the case be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of 
any issues of fact which this court may deem neces-
sary. 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
By--------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
515 Kearns Building 
Balt Lake Crty, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I certify that I am one of the counsel for re-
spondent, petitioner herein, and that in my opinion 
there is good cause to believe the judgment objected 
to is erroneous and that the case ought to be re-
examined as prayed in the Petition, and that this 
Petition is not filed for the purpose of delay or to 
otherwise hinder the prosecution and final deter-
mination of this action. 
HANSON & BALD'WIN and 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
By--------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
515 Kearns Building 
Balt Lake Ci'ty, Utah 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION IS ERRONEOUS IN HOLDING 
THAT SECTION 35-1-62, U.C.A., 1953, A'PPLIES ONLY 
TO RECOVERIES OBTAINED THROUGH THE FIL-
ING OF LAWSUITS AND PARTIES TO THE LAW-
SUIT. 
The Opinion states : 
"With relation to the disbursement of the pro-
ceeds of a recovery against a third party, the 
first subsection of the statute gives a first 
priority to the payment of the costs, includ-
ing attorney's fees, of the action. These ex-
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penses are to be apportioned among the 
parties. 
* * * 
"If an insurance carrier initiates an actio_n 
under this statute against a t~i~~ party, or IS 
made a party in the ~action 1n1 bated ~y the 
injured employee, any attorney's ~ee~ Incur-
red by it would fall within the pr1onty pro-
vided in subsection ( 1). However, in the in-
stant ease, the State Insurance Fund was not 
a party to the action and did not incur 'any 
legal expenses.'' (Court's emphasis) . 
According to the deeision, Seetion 35-1-62, 
U.C.A., 19'63, would not govern the distribution of 
a settlement recovery obtained before a lawsuit was 
filed, since neither the injured employee nor the 
insurance ~arrier would ever be parties to the action. 
Such a result was obviously not intended by 
the legislature since the seeond paragraph of the 
statute states as follows: 
''If any recovery is obtained against such 
third person i1t sh1all be disbursed as follows: 
( 1 ) The reasonable expense of the action, 
including attorney's fees, shall be paid 
and charged proportionately against 
the parties as their interests may ap-
pear. 
(2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full 
for all payments made. 
( 3) :rhe balance shall be paid to the in-
JUred employee or his heirs in case of 
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death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy 
in full any obligation thereafter ac-
cruing against the person liable for 
compensation.'' (Emphasis added) 
No Distinction or indication is made that the sta-
tute is to govern distribution of a recovery only 
after a lawsuit is filed. To the contrary, it specific-
ally states that if any recovery is obtained, it shall 
be disbursed 1as provided for by the statute. Like-
wise, a reading of the entire statute clearly indi-
cates that parties refers to parties in interest and 
not to parties to a lawsuit. In 'the words of the .sta-
tute, the interest of the injured employee or his 
heirs arises "when 1any injury or death ... shall 
have been caused"; and the interest of the person 
paying compensation arises when it "becomes oblig-
ated to pay com pen sa tion". A ruling by this court 
that the provisions of Section 35-1-62 U.C.A., 1953, 
apply only after a l~awsuit has been filed could 
have chaotic effect upon the practice of workmen's 
compensation law in this state. 
·POINT II 
THE DECISION IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT THE 
CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON SUBSECTION (2) 
OF SECTION 35-1-62, U.S.A., 1953, REQUIRES THAT 
THE TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEE BE PAID FROM THE 
EMPLOYEE'S SHARE OF THE RECOVERY. 
The opinion states: 
"Furthermore, subsection ( 2) , requires that 
the insurance carrier be reimbursed in full, 
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providing, of course, the amount of recovery 
is sufficient to do so after payment of the 
leg'al expenses, including attorne~s' fees. If 
plaintiff were right in his contention tha~ an 
insurance carrier is liable for its proprortlon-
ate share of the cost and fees, then an insur-
ance carrier would never be reimbursed in 
full." (Court's emphasis). 
According to this statement of the court, the in-
surance carrier is forever relieved of paying any 
share of 'the attorney's fees, contrary to the require-
ment expressed in subsection ( 1), which states: 
"The reasonable expense of the action, includ-
ing attorneys' fees shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear." 
It is elementary that there are only two parties in 
interest to a recovery obtained against a third party 
tort feasor. First, the injured employee, and second, 
the person who has paid or who is obligated to pay 
compensation. If disbursement were made accord-
ing to the court's decision, the results would be as 
follows: 
First. The casts of the action would be paid, 
including fees of the employee's attorney and 
the insurance carrier's attorney, if the insur-
ance company was named as a party. 
Second: The insurance carrier would be re-
imbursed for the total !amount it had paid in 
compensation or medical payments. 
Third: The injured employee would receive 
the remainder of the recovery. 
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Therefore, the injured employee has in effect 
paid both attorneys' fees because if the fees ar paid 
first and the insurance carrier is then reimbursed 
in full, the balance of the recovery which is paid 
to the injured employee is reduced by the amount 
of both attorneys' fees. Thus, the court's decision 
would apparently provide for an apportionment of 
the amount of a;ttorney's fee paid each attorney ac-
cording to the interest of his principal in the action, 
but would charge both fees against only one party 
- the injured employee. This result would be in 
direct opposition to the mandate of the legislature 
that the attorneys' fees be charged proportionately 
against the parties as their intere'sts may 'appear. 
POINT III 
THE DE·CISION IS CONTRARY TO ·THE DOC-
TRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION RECOGNIZED 
IN COM1PARABLE STATUTES AND A'T COMMON 
LAW. 
'There is some indication that our present sta-
tute, Section 35-1-62, U.C.A., 1953, was patterned 
after the California statute on this subject since 
Deering's California Labor Code is cited under the 
"Comparable Provisions" section of 'the Uvah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 'The California Statute, Section 
3856, applicable to the payment of attorneys' fees 
at the time our statute w'as rewritten in 1945, read 
as follows: 
"The court shall first 1apply, out of the entire 
amount of any judgment for any damage re-
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covered by the employee, a sufficient amounft 
to reimburse the employer for the amount o 
his expenditures for compensation. _If the em-
ployer has not joined in the ac~ton or has 
not brought action, or if his acti~n h!as _not 
been consolidated the court, on h1s applica-
tion, shall allow,' as a first lien against the 
entire amount of any judgment for any dam-
!ages recovered by the employee, the amount 
of the employer's expenditures for compensa-
tion; provided, however, that where the em-
ployer has failed to join in said action and to 
be represented therein by his own attorney, 
or where the employer has not made arrange-
ments with the employee's attorney to repre-
sent him in said action, the court sh!all fix a 
reasonable attorney's fee, which shall be fixed 
as a share of the an1oun't actually received 
by the employee, to be paid to the employee's 
attorney on account of the services rendered 
by him in effecting recovery for the benefit 
of the employer which said fee shall be de-
ducted from any amounts due the employer." 
(Emphasis added) 
While the Utah statute is worded in more con-
cise terms, it is nevertheless comparable in that it 
purports to cover all situations where" any recovery 
is obtained" and provides that expenses of the ac-
tion be "charged proportionately against the parties 
as their interests may appear". However, the court's 
decision in this case is far afield from the intent ex-
pressed in either statute. In the case of Hardware 
Mutual Casualty Company vs. Butler, 148 P.2d 563 
(Mont. 1944), the widow of a deceased employee 
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retained an attorney of her own selection who 
brought an appropriate 'a,ction against the third 
par'ty tort feasor from which a cash settlement re-
sulted. Regarding the payment of attorneys' fees 
by the insurance carrier, the court stated: 
"However, whereas here, one litigant has 
borne the burden and expense of successful 
litigation which has created and brought into 
court !a fund in which others share with him, 
it is only jus't and equitable that those who 
share the benefits should :contribute to the 
payment for the services of the attorney whose 
labors resulted in creating or preserving of 
such common fund." 
Pennsy lvani1a also has a statute very similar 
to our statute which provides that: 
". . . reasonable attorneys' fees and o'ther 
proper disbursements incurred in obtaining a 
recovery or in effecting a compromise settle-
ment between the employer and the employee, 
if personal representative, his estate or his 
dependen'ts." 
In construing this provision, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
in Yeager vs. Heckman, 158 F. Supp. 933, stated 
that in view of the provisions as to the distribution 
of the proceeds of third party actions, it appears 
that the legislature intended that the attorney's 
fee was to be prorated between the employer and 
the recipient of the compensation, to the extent th!at 
each benefited from \the third party recovery. Short-
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ly thereafter, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
reached the same conclusion in the case of Soliday 
vs. Hires, et al, 142 A. 2d 4'2:5, in which it stated: 
"The logical conclusion is inescaprable that the 
legislature intended that the employer be re-
quired to share the burden of attorneys' f~es 
on the basis of its total benefit from the third 
party recovery, that is, the total amount which 
the carrier would have been called upon to 
pay." 
The Michigan statute on this point provides: 
'''Expenses of recovery ( i'ncluding attorneys' 
fees) shall be appropriated by the court be-
tween the parties as their interests appear at 
the time of said recovery." 
In Horsley vs. Stone & Webster Engineering 
Corporation, 162 F. Supp. 649, the court held that 
this statute required that the insurer pay a portion 
of the !attorney's fee in the third pary action based 
on the ratio of the amount of compensation paid 
to the amount of the total recovery. 
A well-seasoned opinion on facts very similar 
to those in the instant case is found in Voris vs. 
Gulf-Tide Steveadors, 211 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1954). 
The a'ction against a third party was instituted on 
behalf of minor children who had received coinpen-
sation under the Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor 
Workers Compensation Act. A judgment was entered 
in the suit awarding the minor children $7,857.42, 
the insurance carrier $1,7 42.58, and the child-
10 
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ren's attorneys $3,900.00. Upon entry of this 
judgment, the Deputy Commissioner entered a com-
pensation order in which he directed that the em-
ployer and insurance carrier be given credit for the 
sum of $7,85'7.4'2 against further ~compensation to 
the minor children. H!owever, the trial court subse-
quently ruled that it was the total or gross amount 
and not the net recovery which should be accredited 
to the employer's payments. 
1The Court of Appeals analyzed !the decisive 
question as being whether the anwunt recovered 
means the amount actually received by the com-
pensation benefici!aries in the third party act~on 
('that is less attorneys' fees) or whether ·rt means 
a total amount paid by the third party defendant. 
In this regard, the court ~stated: 
''''To hold that the minors recovered the aggre-
gate /amount paid by the defendant would be 
to discard the realities of the situation, and 
to ignore the age old equita:ble principle that 
'one who accomplishes the creation of a fund 
for 1the benefit of another is entitled to re-
imbursement therefrom for the reasonable 
costs thereby incurred. The doctrine of salv-
Jage is akin to this principle. 
* * * 
" ... The insurance carrier was the sole ben-
eficiary of the legal services rendered for 
the plain tiff in the third party action, and 
it does not appear that it was in any way 
prejudiced by the judgment; on the contr!ary, 
it was greatly benefited by it. 'The subrogee 
11 
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has accepted the benefits of that recovery, 
and it should bear its reasonable burdens. It 
would be great injustice to the minors .for 
them to have to pay for services that benefited 
them not at all. The courts draw back from 
the construction of an ambiguous statute that 
would lead to unjust results, just as nature 
draws back from the 'consistency of one of its 
laws that would encase i'n ice fish at the bot-
tom of ~a river." 
To allow the court's decision to stand in the 
case at bar will freeze in the jurisprudence of this 
sta'te equally unjust and irrational doctrines, i.e., 
(1) that Section 3'5-1-62, U.C.A., 1953, does not 
apply to recoveries effected prior to the filing of 
a legal lawsuit and (2) the injured employee must 
always bear the burden of paying not only his own 
attorney's fees, but !also the fees of the insurance 
carrier's attorney if one is employed. It is sub-
mitted that the workmen compensation laws were 
passed by the legislature to benefit injured employees 
and, therefore, they should be construed to this end 
if there is any inconsistencies in the provisions of 
the a~ct. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that on the law 
referred to above, the decision of the trial ·court 
should be affirmed, or in the alternative the case 
remanded for a trial to determine any issues of 
:eact not evident in the record which the court may 
deem determinative of the issues involved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
By--------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
51'5 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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